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1 S. 1447, 107th Cong., P.L. 107-71.  See also U.S. President (G. W. Bush), “Remarks on Signing
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,”Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
vo1. 37, Nov. 19, 2001. 
2 The act directs TSA to prescribe rules and regulations to protect individuals and property on
aircraft.  See 49 U.S.C. 44903 et seq.
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Summary
In November 2003, the U.S. attorney’s office in Miami dropped a criminal case
against a former federal baggage screener charged with stealing from a passenger’s
luggage.  The case was dropped because prosecutors feared that sensitive security
information (SSI) would have to be disclosed.  At issue is the ability of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to prosecute other dishonest agency
employees in the future.  Will the same dilemma that led to the dismissal of this
particular case occur again?  In recent months, this and other important issues relating
to SSI have been raised.  This report provides a brief background on SSI regulation,  an
overview of the current policy issues, and a description of the criticism of, and support
for, SSI policy.  This report will be updated as events warrant. 
Background
On November 16, 2001, 63 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); and
the President signed it into law on November 19, 2001.1  Congress enacted ATSA to
increase aviation security after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Under ATSA,
Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and authorized the
agency to make improvements in the country’s transportation security.2  Based on this
authority, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security transferred authority for the
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Department of Transportation, “Civil Aviation Security Rules,” Federal Register, vol. 67, no. 36,
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existing Federal Aviation Administration regulations,3 which include SSI, to the
Transportation Security Administration4 on February 22, 2002.5  The TSA incorporated
these regulations into its Transportation Security Regulations (TSRs).
The TSRs contain rules on administration, procedure, and security for air, land, and
maritime transportation.  Subchapter A, titled “Administrative and Procedural Rules,”
contains Part 1520, which addresses Sensitive Security Information (SSI).  The Federal
Register notice on the regulations describes or defines SSI as including “information
about security programs, vulnerability assessments, technical specifications of certain
screening equipment and objects used to test screening equipment ... and other
information.”6  This definition is spelled out in more detail in 49 C.F.R. 1520.7, which
is summarized below.
! Section 1520.7(a) protects any security program “that relates to United
States mail to be transported by air.”
! Section 1520.7(b) through (d) covers security directives and information
circulars, selection criteria used in the security screening process, and
security contingency plans and/or instructions pertaining to those plans.
! Section 1520.7(e) through (g) relates to any technical specification of any
device or equipment used for security communications, screening, or
“detecting deadly or dangerous weapons,” including an “explosive,
incendiary, or destructive substance.”
! Section 1520.7(h) covers the release of information that TSA “has
determined may reveal a systemic vulnerability of the aviation system, or
a vulnerability of aviation facilities, to attack.”
! Section 1520.7(i) protects “information [released by TSA] concerning
threats against transportation.”
! Section 1520.7(j) protects “details of aviation security measures.”
! Section 1520.7(k) and (l) relates to any “information” TSA has
prohibited from disclosure under the criteria of 49 U.S.C. 40119, or any
draft, proposed, or recommended change to the information or records
identified in this section.
! Section 1520.7(m) through (p) covers locations, tests, and scores of tests
on all screening methods or equipment.
! Section 1520.7(q) protects “images and descriptions of threat images for
threat projection systems.”
! Section 1520.7(r) relates to all Department of Transportation information
on “vulnerability assessment ... irrespective of mode of transportation.”
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Section 1520.5 specifies that all airport operators, aircraft operators, foreign air
carriers, indirect air carriers, applicants, and other persons who receive SSI must protect
that information from disclosure.  SSI may be exempted from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.7
Controversies
The regulations are intended to reduce the risk of vital security information reaching
the wrong hands and resulting in another terrorist attack.  The regulations governing SSI,
however, have raised a number of concerns about the management of such information
and the accountability of governmental agencies.  This section highlights four cases that
have surfaced over the last two years, in which the SSI regulations were applied to
withhold information.  The cases deal with airport security procedures, employee
accountability, passenger screening, and airport secrecy agreements.   
In January 2003, the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport experienced an early controversy
involving TSA security procedures.  The incident involved a federal screener who
permitted a man to pass through security after his luggage tested positive for an explosive.
The airport was closed for over an hour while TSA and law enforcement authorities
searched for the individual.  After the incident, a TSA spokesman stated that the agency
was “not going to be issuing any kind of report because anything beyond the most general
of comments would lead us into areas which concern sensitive security information.”8
The use of SSI rules to prevent the release of information has raised the concerns of some
experts.  For example, Jane E. Kirtley, director of The Silha Center for the Study of Media
Ethics and Law at the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University
of Minnesota has stated, “The public has a burning interest in knowing how secure the
nation’s airports are.  It is not satisfactory in a democracy to say when an incident happens
that we’re taking care of the problems.”9  On the other hand, some have argued that the
release of certain information could harm the public.  The TSA has stated “if [SSI]
information were to fall into the wrong hands it could be used to attack the transportation
system.”10
A second controversy arose when the U.S. attorney’s office in Miami dropped a
criminal case against a former federal baggage screener who was charged with stealing
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from passengers in November 2003.11  The U.S. attorney’s office withdrew the charges
because a federal judge determined that the defense could cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses, which could raise the possibly of disclosing SSI about TSA’s security and
training procedures.  The problem with the decision of the Justice Department according
to a TSA spokeswoman, is that “future prosecutions of dishonest agency employees
would be hamstrung by the same dilemma that led to the dismissal of the indictment.”12
The public defender in the case suggested that “prosecutors could have drop[ped] the part
of the conspiracy charge relating to the sensitive security information ... and [moved]
forward with the other two underlying offenses — breaking into baggage and stealing
their contents.”13  The U.S. attorney’s office and TSA, however, decided the risk of
releasing SSI was too great.
A third controversy involves the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening system
(CAPPS).  In the summer of 2004, TSA plans to update the system and call it CAPPS II.14
The original CAPPS system attempted to screen passengers by “focusing primarily on
travel patterns and financial transactions.”15  The new system, in addition to monitoring
travel records, will check various personal records of passengers trying to make
reservations.  These records, combined with “CIA, FBI, and other intelligence databases”,
will be used to select certain travelers for additional screening.  Then-TSA Administrator
Loy stated, “I don’t think there is a single project that will do more potential good for
aviation security.”  The system will be able “to trace would-be terrorists, even if they lead
apparently unremarkable lives.”16   Some do not agree the system will function as TSA
believes.17  David Sobel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center thinks that CAPPS
II is a “Catch-22”  that will “present enormous challenges for clearing names — and an
enormous temptation for misuse.”  For example, if a person is flagged by the system,
Sobel says they “are going to want to know, ‘Why am I pulled aside every time I take a
flight?’” Since the system will contain SSI, the answer will be “Sorry, we can’t tell you.”18
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TSA officials point out that “a passenger advocate and appeals process” will be available
when the system goes online.19
A fourth SSI controversy involves a security agreement between airport
administrations, local police departments, and TSA officials.  The agreements prohibit the
local police from commenting on any incident involving SSI that has occurred on airport
property without authorization by the proper TSA officials.  Failure to comply with the
agreement may mean the loss of financial aid for airport security.20  A partial copy of one
of the agreements contains the following two sections.
A copy of any summons, complaint, subpoena or other legal document served upon
a local law enforcement organization that is related to a local proceeding that seeks
records or testimony containing sensitive security information shall be promptly
forwarded to the ... Transportation Security Administration field counsel.
All media releases and other contact with or by media specific to the security
directive, ... the airport security program, or other subsequent or superceding
regulations or documents regarding law enforcement services for aviation security
shall be coordinated with the federal security director or the federal security director’s
designee.  All media releases and other contact with or by media on the terms and
conditions of this reimbursement agreement shall be coordinated with the contracting
officer.21
When these agreements were initially designed, many local officials reportedly were
not sure of the exact level of compliance they required.  For example, police officials in
Des Moines, IA, thought that they might be prevented from discussing with the public “a
bomb or shooting incident at the airport.”  The local police chief, William McCarthy,
reasoned that the “agreement may even prevent officers from ‘reporting the arrest of a
drunk at the airport’” or testifying in court without clearance from TSA.22 
Only after Iowa Senators Charles Grassley and Tom Harkin became involved in the
matter was the agreement clarified.  In a letter to Senator Grassley, TSA Administrator
James Loy explained that the agreement was not a “gag order” for local police, but was
intended to inform TSA officials about incidents that occur on airport property.  In
addition, Loy stated “that law enforcement officers who are asked to testify about purely
factual matters that do not reveal sensitive [security] information may do so without
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consultation with the federal government.”  The TSA letter also explained that copies of
the agreement could be made public except for parts with sensitive security information,
such as “Appendix A, which concerns the amount of airport security.”23
Currently, the Des Moines issue has been resolved between TSA and local police.
Lt. David Huberty of the Des Moines police department has stated that, since the
clarification of the agreement, SSI has not been an issue.  In fact, local police and TSA
officials have a good working relationship.  The close interaction between local and
federal authorities in Des Moines, according to Lt. Huberty, has provided the airport-
assigned police officers with a working understanding of SSI.24  For example, incidents
that occur on airport grounds outside the terminal are not generally reported to TSA
officials since local police understand that they do not involve SSI.  Incidents that do
occur within the terminal or at checkpoints, however, are treated differently in that TSA
officials are involved and local police will write up more generalized descriptions of the
incident so that SSI is not revealed.25  In addition, a TSA attorney will provide a training
seminar for the Des Moines police department to better understand the SSI regulation.26
Conclusions
The implementation of SSI regulations has created a number of controversies for
TSA.  The agency has worked to alleviate these concerns, but some experts are not
convinced.  They are still alarmed that SSI is currently “muzzling debate of security
measures,”27 and although they acknowledge that some information should be kept secret,
“the refusal to release other information seems overzealous.”  For example, according to
Paul S. Hudson of the Aviation Consumer Action Project, at a recently held aviation
meeting, information in one report was labeled SSI and prevented participants from
having “any exchange of views.”28  For some, the issue being raised is the need for
security versus the public’s right to know.  This issue, Kirtley contends, comes down to
whether “our openness was what made us so vulnerable.”29  SSI justifications are not
made on those grounds, but the TSA warns that SSI would “be damaging to the security
of the [airline] industry and could well be damaging to the security of the United States
were it to be publicly disclosed.”30  SSI will continually be discussed in a post 9/11
environment where the TSA has to weigh its duty to provide air, land, and maritime
security against the need to keep the public informed and maintain constitutional rights
and safeguards.  
